## Private Pensions:

## The Real Return

## **EF** EuroFinuse

Research

The European Federation of Financial Services Users Fédération Européenne des Usagers des Services Financiers

#### About The European Federation of Financial Services Users

- The European Federation of Financial Services Users (EuroFinUse) was founded in 2009 under the name of EuroInvestors
- EuroFinUse advocates for all financial services users: private shareholders, bond holders, fund investors, pension fund participants, life insurance policy holders, bank savers, mortgage borrowers, etc.
- Today EuroFinUse represents 50 national associations which in turn have about 4 million citizens as members. Its activities are supported by the European Commission.
- Main 2013 objective: restore confidence and trust in the financial providers and markets.
- President: Jean Berthon (FAIDER)
- Vice-Presidents: Jella Benner-Heinacher (DSW),
  Jan Maarten Slagter (VEB), Leif Vindevag (Aktiespararna)
- Managing Director: Guillaume Prache




#### **EF** EuroFinuse

#### Background: OECD 2012 Pensions Outlook

#### Pension funds 5-yr and 10-yr returns

... and then advises citizens to contribute more to such funds!



**EF** EuroFinuse

### Background: OECD 2012 Pensions Outlook Private Pensions 5-yr and 10-yr returns

 $\checkmark <u>Real</u> returns (after inflation): this is what matters for pension savers, very rarely disclosed elsewhen$ 


#### BUT

No disclosure of <u>net of all charges borne by pension savers e.g.</u> "what goes into his pocket"
 Does not cover all EU countries e.g. France
 Only covers private pension funds but not all Third Pillar pension products
 No tax impact included





#### EF research on an index equity investment ETF vs. Retail fund



CONFIDENTIAL - DO NOT COPY

**EF** EuroFinuse

EuroFinUse methodology real return (after tax)

- Nominal return (net of fees and commissions borne by pension savers)
- Minus inflation (measured by the consumer price indices)
- Whenever possible minus estimated taxes borne by pension savers
- 1<sup>st</sup> phase includes three country cases: Denmark, France and Spain
- 2<sup>nd</sup> phase will examine additional countries





Modelled yearly Returns of Private Pension Products After

#### Inflation and Before Taxes


	Modelled nominal return	Taxation on returns	Investment charges	Net nominal return	Net real return
Denmark	3.46% + 4.0% = 7.46%	-15.3%	-1.0%	5.32%	1.32%
France	1.49% + 7.3% = 8.79%	-23.0%	-2.0%	4.77%	-2.53%
Spain	1.79% + 6.0% = 7.79%	Tax free	-1.8%	6.00%	0.00%




**EF** EuroFinuse

Country cases (actual historical returns)


Real yearly returns of private pensions in Denmark





Country cases (actual historical returns)

Real yearly returns of private pensions in Spain



#### Future outlook

- Only Denmark provides significant positive real returns (1<sup>st</sup> phase of research)
- Poor disclosure of historical returns, almost never after inflation, after all charges, and after tax
- Sale and advice: more influenced by commissions than by suitability (64% of respondents of a CFA Institute Survey agree)
- Solvency rules reduce opportunities to earn real returns, by shifting asset allocation away from real assets in favour of fixed income, with particular emphasis on sovereign debt;
- Complex and burdensome taxation of private pensions (e.g. tax in France can exceed 100% of real returns)
- Capital markets performance is not the primary factor of recent negative returns;





#### Why ? - Real Case Example

#### Capital markets vs. Belgian Occupational pension fund 13 year performance (2000 to 2012)

Capital markets (benchmark index*) performanc	e				
Nominal performance	+48%				
Real performance (before tax)	+11%				
Fund performance					
Nominal performance	+8%				
Real performance (before tax)	-19%				

\* 50 % Equity / 50 % bonds (MSCI World equity index and JPM Euro Bond Index)

**EF** EuroFinuse



#### Why ? - Conclusion

#### Not primarily capital markets performance

- 1. Fees and commissions
- 2. Investment firm choices and performance
- 3. Financial repression and taxes





#### Policy implications / requests from pension savers

Improve and harmonise disclosures for all long term and retirement savings products

- "PRIPs" (EU proposed Regulation for a Key Information Document (KID) fore all retail investment products
- Disclosure of full costs and long term historical returns must be provided:

-After inflation;-After all charges borne directly or indirectly by the investor; and-After taxes (as required in the US for investment funds).

Design simple retirement savings vehicles and securities that protect the long term purchasing power of savings

- Readily accessible, without need for advice and its associated commissions
- Promoted by public programmes





#### Policy implications / requests from pension savers

- Special treatment by prudential regulation of all pension products (insurance and non-insurance regulated)
  long duration of the liabilities allow for higher portfolio allocation on investments such as equities;
- Taxation to incentivize long term retirement savings and investment over consumption and short term savings, or at least not penalise this behaviour;
- Basic financial mathematics part of school curricula, as this is a crucial tool in selecting suitable investment products for pension savers;







The European Federation of Financial Services Users Fédération Européenne des Usagers des Services Financiers

# Thank you for your attention

info@eurofinuse.org

